Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1986

William D. Blodgett and Florence G. Blodgett, his
wife v. Joe Martsch, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell
Martsch : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lester A. Perry; M. Karlynn Hinman; James J. Cassity; Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell; attorney for
respondents.
James A. Arrowsmith; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Blodgett v. Martsch, No. 860372 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/291

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
DOCKET NO.

THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT,
his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No. 860372-CA

JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
LESTER A. PERRY
M. KARLYNN HINMAN
JAMES J. CASSITY
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents

JAMES A. ARROWSMITH
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801) 486-5634
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

#£CLiVnO
§g^i^^:

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL

1

STATUTES AND RULES

2

REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

1.

The Parties.

3

2.

The Underlying Facts.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

I.

A PARTY WHO HAS AGREED TO QUIET
TITLE AND HAS QUITCLAIMED ALL
RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN A
PROPERTY SHOULD BE PRECLUDED
FROM CONTESTING A CLERICAL
CORRECTION TO A JUDGMENT

9

II.

THE JUDGMENT TO QUIET TITLE DOES
NOT ADD OR CONFER NEW RIGHTS ON
THE BLODGETTS OR TAKE ANY RIGHTS
FROM MS. PURCELL

10

III. CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS
SHOULD NOT BE APPEALABLE; THE
SUBSTANCE OF A TRANSACTION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF ITS MERITS

12

IV.

THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF
STATUTE CONCERNING MS. PURCELL'S
COUNSEL

14

V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED
THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO QUIET
TITLE PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a)

15

CONCLUSION

17

ADDENDUM
-l-

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Page
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co.,
579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978)

13

Blodgett v. Martsch,
590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)

4

Lindsay v. Atkin,
680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984)

16

Meagher v. Equity Oil Co.,
5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956)

16

Richards v. Siddoway,
24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143 (1970)

15

Security Adiustment Bureau, Inc. v. West,
20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (Utah 1968)

14

Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.,
669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983)

15

State, Etc. v. Santiago,
590 P.2d 337-38 (Utah 1979)
(footnotes to citations omitted)

11

Van Cott v. Wall,
53 Utah 282, 170 P. 42 (Utah 1918)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13

10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36

14

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(a)

passim

-ii-

CONTENTS OF THE ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Excerpts from Defendants-Respondents Brief
in Case No. 86-0178CA (with chronology)
Order and Judgment (certified August 13, 1986)

-iii-

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT,
his wife,
Case No. 860372-CA

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals by
the Supreme Court on July 8, 1987.

Although the Plaintiffs-

Respondents contend that the Defendant-Appellant lacks standing to bring the appeal, jurisdiction would otherwise arise
from the filing of a final order in the District Court in a
case not specifically designated for direct appeal to the
Supreme Court and from its assignment power.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL
I.

Whether this appeal should be dismissed because the Appel-

lant lacks standing to complain about the correction of a
clerical error and because the Appellant has quit-claimed all
right, title and interest in the subject property.

II.

Whether an Appellant who has agreed to a settlement which

included quieting title and who subsequently quitclaimed all
right, title and interest in the subject property can object
to the correction of a judgment to provide the opposing party
with quiet title to the property.
III.

Whether the correction of a clerical error in a dismiss-

al order to reflect the terms of a settlement agreement and
minute order should be affirmed on appeal.
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes, rules and other materials have been
set forth in the addendum ("Ad.") to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Excerpts from Defendants-Respondents1 brief in
Case No. 86-0178CA ("Alco Appeal Brief")
Order and Judgment (certified August 33, 1986)
REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Plaintiffs-Respondents request that this Court
take judicial notice of pleadings, orders, decisions, exhibits
and opinions in related actions, deeds and other like documentary materials.

The Plaintiffs-Respondents have moved the

Court to consolidate this matter with another pending case
involving the subject property:

William D. Blodgett and

Florence G. Blodgett, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Zions First
National Bank, Defendant, Stanley L. Pace and Allan D. McComb,
-2-

individually and dba ALCO Investment/ Defendants-Appellants,
No. 86-0178-CA.

From time to time, this brief will cite to

the record in that case as "Alco record".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The Parties.
The Plaintiffs-Respondents William D. Blodgett and

his wife Florence G. Blodgett (the "Blodgetts") were owners of
two tracts of property in Salt Lake County.

That property is

the subject of this action and has been the subject of six
other legal proceedings involving them.
The Defendant-Appellant Betty Purcell, also known as
Betty Purcell Martsch, was formerly the president of the Raco
Car Was System ("Raco").

Ms. Purcell instigated a scheme to

use the Blodgetts1 property as security for her proposed car
wash ventures.
2.

The Underlying Facts.
Ms. Purcellfs statement of facts omits several cru-

cial and undisputed facts which explain why judgment quieting
title was entered by the District Court in this case.
This case is the culmination of the transactions
beginning in 1971 when Ms. Purcell and Raco falsely represented to a bank that two tracts of land owned by the Blodgetts
could be used as security for a loan to Raco.

The Blodgetts

had agreed to permit only one tract to be used as security,
but they were deceived into signing papers covering two
tracts.

Raco fell into arrears on the loan, and both tracts
-3-

were taken from the Blodgetts under foreclosure proceedings
which were improperly conducted.
lowed.

Extensive proceedings fol-

In a suit against Ms. Purcell and others, the

Blodgetts recorded a lis pendens on the property on November
4, 1974 with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3714, Page
334, giving notice that they had filed suit to terminate the
interests of all defendants, including Ms. Purcell.

See

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).
After a motion for summary judgment and an appeal
with a remand to the District Court, the parties to the
Blodgetts1 litigation agreed on the record to a settlement of
their disputes which included quieting title to the disputed
property in the Blodgetts.

The settlement terms were recited

and approved in open court on December 7, 1979, before Judge
Baldwin.

The settlement terms stated by counsel and court

were, in relevant part:
MR. BUSHNELL [attorney for the Blodgetts]:
We'll get the quit-claims we want signed,
you get the releases and satisfactions you
want signed. Why don't you prepare the
release you want for the bank and get the
check and we'll go from there. Will that be
all right?
THE COURT [Judge Baldwin]:
prejudice of the action.
MR. BUSHNELL:

A dismissal with

We'll prepare the dismissal.

MR. BARKER [attorney for Betty Purcell]: If
you want quit-claim deeds, we are going to
mail them to Idaho and get them back. This
is a few days mail time.

_4_

MR. BUSHNELL:
that-- well--

Lets get all of it done plus

MR. BARKER: If you can do it by the Court
Order and quiet title to the matter-MR. BUSHNELL:
THE COURT:
MR. BARKER:

Let's get the deed too.

All right.
Very good.

(Alco Record 103-07, emphasis added.)
In its minute order, the District Court referred to
the terms set forth on the record as the terms which were
agreed to in settlement.

On January 15, 1980, Ms. Purcell

executed a quitclaim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts
pursuant to the terms approved in the Settlement Order.
Record 109-12)

(Alco

Because of clerical oversight, the final Stipu-

lation of Dismissal signed by the parties and Order entered in
the case on May 5, 1980, did not quiet title but only dismissed all claims with prejudice.

(Record 990, copies of the

Stipulation and Order are attached to Ms. Purcell1s brief.)
At about the time that Ms. Purcell was involved in
using the Blodgett's property to secure the Raco loan, Ms.
Purcell, together with her former attorney Lorin Pace, also
obtained a separate loan from Zions First National Bank
("Zions").

Ms. Purcell and Mr. Pace both signed a promissory

note in connection with the Zions loan.
quently fell into default.

The Zions loan subse-

Zions brought three court proceed-

ings against Ms. Purcell and Mr. Pace and took default judgments against both parties to the note.
-5-

Mr. Pace paid Zions

pursuant to a default judgment, and Zions purportedly assigned
its default judgments against Ms. Purcell to Alco Investment,
which apparently took the assignment from Zions pursuant to an
agreement between Mr. Pace and Alco.

Alco's principals were

Stanley L. Pace and Allan D. McComb.

(See the excerpts from

the Respondents1 brief in that case in the Addendum for citations and further details.)
In its efforts to recover against Ms. Purcell on the
assignment of the Zions default judgments, Alco attempted to
foreclose on the Blodgetts1 land because Ms. Purcell had had,
at one time, an interest in the property.

(The details are

set forth in the excerpts from the Alco Appeal brief in the
Addendum.)
Alco's foreclosure efforts showed that although Ms.
Purcell had quitclaimed all of her right, title and interest
in the Blodgetts1 land to the Blodgetts and had agreed to the
terms of a court settlement including quieting title to the
Blodgetts, no judgment or other document recorded the language
of quieting title to that land in the Blodgetts.

The

Blodgetts thus took steps under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to correct the error in the prior judgment,
incorrectly denominating their initial motion under Rule 60(b)
rather than as a clerical correction under Rule 60(a) to supply the terms of "quiet title" as they had been read into the
record before the District Court.

That mistake was subsequent-

ly recognized and an order and judgment of quiet title was
-6-

entered pursuant to Rule 60(a) on August 13, 1986, upon signature of Honorable David B. Dee.

(A copy is appended to Ms.

Purcellfs brief.)
That Order and Judgment to Quiet Title did not contain the hand-written word "Amended" at the time signed.

The

first page of a certified copy of that Order and Judgment
shows that it was filed in the Clerk's Office on August 13,
1986 and that it was recorded on August 15, 1986 with the
Recorder in Salt Lake County.

Counsel for the Blodgetts ob-

tained a certified copy of that Order and Judgment on August
13, 1986.

A copy of the Order and Judgment of Quiet Title

showing the Clerk's and the Recorder's stamps is set forth in
the Addendum.

At some other date, some party unknown to the

Blodgetts apparently added the handwritten word "Amended" to
the first page.

The copy of the Order and Judgment attached

to Ms. Purcell's brief shows the stamp showing filing with the
clerk's office on August 13, 1986, but does not show the stamp
of the County Recorder.

It is also not a certified copy, as

is the copy which had been relied upon by the Blodgetts.

In

short, at the time the Order and Judgment was signed by Judge
Dee, it was not denominated as "Amended".
On January 16, 1986, the District Court, per Sawaya,
J., denied summary judgment to Alco, Stanley L. Pace and Allen
D. McComb and granted judgment to the Blodgetts, providing:
"Title to the above-identified real property is quieted in the
plaintiffs [the Blodgetts] as against any and all right, ti-7-

tie, or interest claimed by the defendants, Zions First National Bank and Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. McComb dba Alco Investment."

Since those defendants sought to foreclose on the

property solely because of Ms. Purcell!s prior interests in
the property, the January 16, 1986 decision of the District
Court quieting title in the Blodgetts also resolves any claims
of Ms. Purcell.

(See the excerpts from the Alco Appeal

brief in the Addendum.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since Ms. Purcell quitclaimed all right, title and
interest to the property to the Blodgetts more than two years
ago, the fact that the Blodgetts have quieted title to that
property in themselves causes no grievance of any sort to Ms.
Purcell.

Quieting title neither vests title nor increases the

rights that the Blodgetts already had pursuant to the quitclaim deed, so Ms. Purcell has suffered no loss or injury.
With no loss or injury, she has no standing to appeal from an
order which merely corrected an old judgment.

Moreover, since

the initial litigation proceedings between the Blodgetts and
Ms. Purcell involved the filing of a lis pendens by the
Blodgetts, the resolution of the dispute over the property was
binding upon Ms. Purcell and divested her of all claims of
right, title or interest in that property.
Since the correction was not a "further proceeding"
and since her prior attorney has neither died nor in any way
been limited from practice in Utah, the Blodgetts were under
-8-

no statutory duty or obligation to advise her to obtain other
title before correcting a clerical error in an old judgment.
There is no irregularity in the procedure.
Courts have at any time the power to correct clerical errors under Rule 60(a); the error in question was merely
that so the correction was proper.

The fact that the

Blodgetts initially referred to Rule 60(b) before correcting
their application for corrective action does not give rise to
an appealable issue or cause any problem in the corrected
judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. A PARTY WHO HAS AGREED TO QUIET TITLE AND HAS
QUITCLAIMED ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN A PROPERTY
SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING A CLERICAL
CORRECTION TO A JUDGMENT
Since it is undisputed that the Blodgetts had filed
a lis pendens in 1974 on the subject property, any interest
which Ms. Purcell had against the property is subject to the
lis pendens.

Her interest was extinguished when the Blodgetts

prevailed in their litigation against her, and she is bound by
the results of the case.
Ms. Purcell agreed to a settlement which dismissed
all claims and which provided for quieting title in the
Blodgetts, as stated on the record of the trial court.

She

subsequently signed and delivered a quitclaim deed to the
subject property.

The quitclaim, by statute, abolished and

surrendered all of her right, title and interest in the
-9-

property so quitclaimed to the Blodgetts.

Utah Code Ann.

57-1-13 provides that
Such deed when executed as required by
law shall have the effect of a conveyance of
all right, title, interest and estate of the
grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the
date of such conveyance.
The District Court, in two proceedings, has recognized that Ms. Purcell has no interest in the subject
property:

in this proceeding and in the Alco proceeding.

The

District Court recognized in that case that title had been
quieted in the Blodgetts with respect to the claims there
related to her.

(An appeal is pending in that case, No.

860178CA.)
Consequently, Ms. Purcell lacks standing to object
to the order and judgment which correctly reflects the title
quieted in the Blodgetts.

This appeal should be dismissed.

II. THE JUDGMENT TO QUIET TITLE DOES NOT
ADD OR CONFER NEW RIGHTS ON THE BLODGETTS OR
TAKE ANY RIGHTS FROM MS. PURCELL
Because of her quitclaim in settlement of complicated litigation, Ms. Purcell has no right, title or interest in
the property.

Consequently, she has suffered no injury whatso-

ever because the Blodgetts have corrected a judgment to reflect the terms of the settlement by quieting title in them.
They gained nothing which they did not already have, and Ms.
Purcell has lost nothing.
has no injury and no claim.

If she has lost nothing, then she
She lacks standing, she lacks a
-10-

claim upon which relief could be granted, and she lacks any
legal or equitable reason to justify this appeal.
Both Supreme Court decision and statute demonstrate
that a quiet title action quiets an existing title and does
not establish title.

As the Supreme Court has determined:

We are compelled to conclude that the
decree quieting title did not constitute a
vesting of title. Our conclusion is premised upon the fact that a quiet title action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet
an existing title against an adverse or
hostile claim of another and not one brought
to establish title. One seeking such
equitable relief must allege title, entitlement to possession, and that the estate or
interest claimed by others is adverse or
hostile to the alleged claims of title or
interest. Hence it is to be seen that the
effect of a decree quieting title is not to
vest title but rather is to perfect an
existing title as against other claimants.
State, Etc. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979)
(footnotes to citations omitted)
In this case, the Blodgetts were engaged in litigation adverse to Ms. Purcell and others.
pendens on the subject property.

They had filed a lis

They resolved the case by

settlement in open court, including quieting title to the
property.

Ms. Purcell quitclaimed.

Title thus resided in the

Blodgetts upon the settlement of that case.

When the Alco

litigation erupted and Alco tried to claim the property because Ms. Purcell had once had an interest in it, it was necessary for the Blodgetts to defend their property by correcting
an old judgment to reflect the outcome of prior suits. Under

-11-

such circumstances, even though somewhat complex, only one
simple conclusion can be reached:

Ms. Purcell has lost noth-

ing, the Blodgetts have gained nothing, and no new title has
vested; title has only been perfected as it has existed for
over a decade.

This appeal should be dismissed.

III. CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS SHOULD NOT BE
APPEALABLE; THE SUBSTANCE OF A TRANSACTION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF ITS MERITS
When the Blodgetts were surprised by the efforts of
Alco and its principals to take their property, they took
immediate steps to rectify what was, in fact, a clerical or
mechanical error in the recording of the judgment.

While it

was abundantly clear that all litigation had been resolved and
that the Blodgetts were to retain the property which had been
in question, the final dismissal order was a simple one, prepared in summary form to rid the parties of the burdens of
further litigation and to dismiss all claims.
In conjunction with that settlement, Ms. Purcell, as
stated, delivered her quitclaim deed.

The mechanical error

arose because the judgment did not record the oral settlement
by reciting the formulary words "quiet title", although that
was clearly the central term of the settlement and the reason
why it was acceptable to the Blodgetts.

Inadvertently, every-

one relied on the simple settlement dismissing all claims with
prejudice and the delivery of the quitclaim deed.
The Alco efforts to obtain the property revealed the
oversight, justifying a correction under Rule 60.
-12-

The motion

for the correction was originally brought under Rule 60(b),
although it should have been done under Rule 60(a).
matter was discussed in District Court and rectified.

This
The

District Court clearly recognized the need to correct the
clerical error.

Such is the substance of the transaction; it

does not give rise to an appealable order.

Such corrections

of errors may even be made after an appeal has been taken.
See Baqnall v. Suburbia Land Co. # 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978).
If this Court were to vacate the corrected judgment,
thus requiring further proceedings below, then hearings on the
meaning and terms of the settlement would occur.

The result

would undoubtedly be that the Blodgetts were entitled to quiet
title, and an appropriate judgment reflecting the quiet title
language would be entered.

Ms. Purcell would, as here, have

lost nothing in such proceedings—except the time and costs
necessary to prolong litigation.
those proceedings.
be superfluous.

She could gain nothing from

Further proceedings in this matter would

Indeed, it appears that the only possible

motivation for the attempted appeal in this case is that Ms.
Purcell knows that Alco and its principals are trying to collect against her in connection with her default on the loan to
Zions; it would be much to her advantage if Alco could collect
against property in which she no longer has any interest rather than against her current assets.

-13-

IV.

THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF STATUTE
CONCERNING MS. PURCELL'S COUNSEL

Ms. Purcell's argument that the corrected judgment
was taken against her improperly because she had no notice to
obtain counsel is flawed.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36, the

statute she cites, is limited to the situation "When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended" from practice.

Ms.

Purcell's former attorney, Ronald C. Barker, Esq., is a practicing attorney.

The statute does not apply if the attorney

has withdrawn from the case or if there are other circumstances in which he chooses not to represent a client; it applies
only if he dies or is disbarred or otherwise removed or suspended from the practice of law.

Van Cott v. Wall, 53 Utah

282, 170 P. 42 (Utah 1918), see also Security Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (Utah
1968).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36 is further limited to the
situation when "further proceedings" are to be had against the
party whose attorney is no longer representing him.

In this

situation, the Blodgetts sought no "further proceedings."
Rather, the Blodgetts sought to correct the judgment in the
old and existing proceedings.

They were simply reciting in

their judgment that which Ms. Purcell and her counsel had
agreed to before:

that title be quieted in the Blodgetts.

The correction of a clerical error or other mistake under Rule

-14-

60(a) cannot be construed as a "further proceeding."

No viola-

tion of any obligation has occurred.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED THE ORDER AND
JUDGMENT TO QUIET TITLE PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(a)
To correct the error in the original dismissal or-

der, the Blodgetts served Ms. Purcell and filed on March 17,
1986 a Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title under Rule 60(a).

That Rule provides:

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders.
(Emphasis added)
In Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983), this Court construed Rule 60(a),
defining a clerical mistake as one which is mechanical in
nature, is apparent on the record and does not involve a legal
decision or judgment by an attorney.

The distinction between

a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who
made it; rather, the distinction depends on whether it was
made in entering the judgment (judicial error) or in recording
or reflecting the judgment as rendered (clerical error).
See Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143,
145 (1970).

Corrections contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be

undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention
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of the court and the parties.

See Lindsay v. Atkin, 680

P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984).
Under the criteria set forth in Stanger, Richards and Lindsay, the omission of the quiet title language
in the Dismissal Order constituted a "clerical error."

The

error was mechanical and occurred in the course of recording
or reflecting a judgment, since the court agreed to a "quiet
title" in the record but the written judgment neglected to
recite the formulary words.

Making the correction required no

decision or judgment of an attorney; the correction arose
naturally and from the plain records of the settlement which
had been approved by Judge Baldwin.

Certainly Ms. Purcell has

no complaint about it since she has already delivered a quitclaim deed.
In Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299
P.2d 827 (1956), this Court reviewed a case in which the trial
judge signed an order on the erroneous assumption that the
order, as prepared by counsel, correctly reflected his judgment in the matter.

The Supreme Court held that the execution

of the order was a mistake of a perfunctory or clerical nature
since the order did not accurately reflect the result of the
trial court's judgment and that the trial court could and
properly did correct the error upon its own motion.
In this case, the trial judge executed an order,
assuming that all aspects of the settlement previously approved had been covered.

The error was perfunctory and cleri-16-

cal.

It was properly correctable by the Blodgetts1 Rule 60(a)

motion.

This appeal is thus lacking in merit and should be

dismissed.

The corrected order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Blodgetts respectful-

ly request that this appeal be dismissed, that the judgment
correcting the original dismissal order in their favor be
affirmed and that the Court award them their costs, disbursements and counsel fees on this action.

They seek such other

and further relief as may be just and proper.
DATED:

August 14, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

By
M. Karlynn Hinman
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

day of August,

1987, I mailed four true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Respondents, postage prepaid, to:
James A. Arrowsmith
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109
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UTAH CODE
1985-1986

Real Estate

in which such real estate is situated, but shall be
valid and binding- between the parties thereto
without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification
or record, and as to all other persons who have had
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument,
recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with
notice of the interest of any person or persons not
named in such instrument or of the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by such
instrument free and clear o f all claims not disclosed
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as
herein provided setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.
< 1953
57-1-7. Applicability of section.
This act shall apply to all instruments, whether
recorded prior to or subsequent to the effective date
hereof, but as to instruments which have been
recorded prior thereto, it shall not apply until one
year from its effective date.
1953
57-1-8. Powers of attorney - T o be recorded.
Every power of attorney, or other instrument in
writing, containing a power to convey any real
estate as agent or attorney for the owner thereof, or
to execute as agent or attorney for another any
conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed or
may be affected, shall be acknowledged or proved,
and certified and recorded, as conveyances whereby
real estate is conveyed or affected are required to be
acknowledged or proved and certified and recorded.
1953

57-1-9. Revocation to be recorded.
N o such power of attorney or other instrument
shall be deemed to be revoked by any act of the
person by whom it was executed until the instrument containing such revocation shall be filed for
record in the same office in which the instrument
containing the power is recorded, or until it is*
canceled of record as provided by law.
1953
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.
If any person shall hereafter convey any real
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same
in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of
such conveyance have the legal estate in such real
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the
legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns,
and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such
legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of
conveyance.
1953
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey.
• Any person claiming title to any real estate may,
notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession
thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the
same manner and with the same effect as if he were
in the actual possession thereof.
1953
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed • Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the
following form:
WARRANTY D E E D
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys and

warrants to
(insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here
describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day
of
19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the
grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances,
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with
covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the
premises; that he has good right to convey the
same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the
premises are free from all encumbrances; and that
the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in
the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful
claims whatsoever. A n y exceptions t o such
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed
following the description of the land.
1953
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed - Effect.
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in
the following form:
QUITCLAIM DEED
(here insert name), grantor, o f
(insert place of residence), hereby quitclaims to
(insert name), grantee, of
(here insert
place of residence), for the sum of
dollars,
the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day
of
, 19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title,
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the
premises therein described and all rights, privileges
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date
of such conveyance.
1953
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect.
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the
following form:
MORTGAGE
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee, of
(insert
place of residence), for the sum of
dollars,
the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following
indebtedness (here state amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom
payable and where).
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said premises, and the sum of
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
day of
, 19
.
Such mortgage when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land
therein described, together with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the indebtedness
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78-51-33.

Judicial Code

not otherwise.
(3) T o receive m o n e y claimed by his client in a n
action o r proceeding during the pendency thereof or
after j u d g m e n t , unless a revocation of his authority
is filed, a n d , u p o n payment thereof a n d n o t otherwise, t o discharge t h e claim o r acknowledge satisfaction of the j u d g m e n t .
1953
78-51-33. Proof of authority for appearance.
The court may on motion of either party and on
the showing of reasonable grounds therefor require
the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of
several adverse parties, t o produce or prove by his
own oath or otherwise the authority under which he
appears, a n d until he does so may stay all proceedings by him o n behalf of t h e parties for whom he
assumes t o appear.
1953
78-51-34. Change o f attorney.
T h e attorney in any action or special proceeding
m a y be changed at any time before judgment or
final determination, as follows:
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or
entered upon t h e minutes.
(2) Upon t h e order of t h e court or judge thereof
u p o n the application of the client, after notice t o the
attorney.
1953
78-51-35. Effect - Notice of change.
W h e n a n attorney is changed as provided in t h e
next preceding section [78-51-34], written notice
of t h e change a n d of t h e substitution of a new attorney o r of t h e appearance of t h e party in person
must b e given t o t h e adverse party; until then he
m u s t recognize t h e former attorney.
1953
78-51-36. Notice to appoint successor.
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases t o act as such, a party t o an action
or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney
must before any further proceedings are had against
him be required by the adverse party, by written
notice, t o appoint another attorney or t o appear in
person.
1953
78-51-37. Conviction of crime - Judgment of
disbarment - D o t y o f clerks o f court.
U p o n conviction of a n attorney a n d counselor of
felony, or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,
the judgment of the Supreme Court must be that the
n a m e of t h e accused be stricken from the roll of
attorneys a n d counselors of t h e court, a n d that he
be precluded from practicing as such attorney or
counselor in all t h e courts of this state; upon conviction in other cases, the judgment of the court may
be, according t o t h e gravity of the offense charged,
deprivation of the right t o practice as a n attorney or
counselor in t h e courts of this state permanently or
for a limited period. T h e clerk of the court in which
any such conviction is h a d must within thirty days
thereafter transmit t o the Supreme Court a certified
copy of t h e record of conviction, which shall be
conclusive evidence thereof.
1953
78-51-38. Suretyship - Attorney forbidden to
assume.
N o practicing attorney a n d counselor shall
become a surety in any civil or criminal action or
proceeding in which he is engaged as attorney.
1953
78-51-39. Certain officials not to practice law.
Sheriffs, clerks of courts a n d constables, and their
deputies, are prohibited from practicing law or
acting as attorneys a n d counselors, or from having
as a partner a n attorney a n d counselor or any o n e
w h o acts as such.
1953
78-51-40. Corporations and associations
forbidden to practice - Exceptions.

380

It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association, except such as are organized for
benevolent or charitable purposes, or organizations
approved by the Supreme Court a n d formed for the
purpose of assisting persons without means in the
pursuit of civil remedies, t o hold itself out t o the
public by advertisement o r otherwise as being entitled t o practice law or t o furnish attorneys or counselors, or t o render legal services or advice of any
kind in any action or proceeding, or t o solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for the
purpose of bringing action thereon. Any corporation
or voluntary association violating any of the provisions of this section is liable t o a fine of not more
than $5,000; and every officer, agent or employee of
such corporation or voluntary association who directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corporation or voluntary association in any of the acts
herein prohibited, or assists such corporation or
voluntary association t o d o such prohibited acts, is
guilty of a misdemeanor. T h e fact that such officer,
agent or employee is a duly a n d regularly licensed
attorney at law shall n o t be held t o permit or allow
any such corporation or voluntary association t o do
the acts prohibited herein, n o r shall such fact be a
defense upon t h e trial of any of the persons mentioned herein for a violation of the provisions of this
section.
1953
78-51-41. Compensation - Lien.
T h e compensation of a n a t t o r n e y a n d counselor
for his services is governed b y agreement, express or
implied, which is n o t restrained b y l a w . F r o m the
c o m m e n c e m e n t of a n action, o r t h e service of an
answer containing a c o u n t e r c l a i m , t h e attorney who
appears for a party h a s a lien u p o n his client's
cause of action o r counterclaim, which attaches t o a
verdict, report, decision o r j u d g m e n t in his client's
favor a n d t o t h e proceeds thereof in whosoever
h a n d s they m a y c o m e , a n d c a n n o t b e affected by
any settlement between t h e parties before or after
judgment.
1953
78-51-42. Refusing to pay over money Penalty.
A n a t t o r n e y a n d counselor w h o receives money or
property o f his client in t h e c o u r s e of his professional business a n d w h o refuses t o p a y o r deliver the
same t o t h e person entitled t h e r e t o within a reasonable time after d e m a n d is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953

78-51-43. Exception - Demand for bond.
When a n attorney a n d counselor claims t o be
entitled t o a lien u p o n m o n e y o r property of his
client in his possession h e is n o t liable t o the penalty
of t h e next preceding section [78-51-42], unless he
neglects o r refuses t o p a y o r deliver such money or
property t o t h e person entitled thereto upon such
person giving a bond with sufficient surety, t o be
approved by t h e clerk of t h e district court, conditioned for t h e payment of t h e a m o u n t of such attorney's claim when legally established.
1953
78-51-44. Exception o n giving bond.
N o r shall t h e attorney a n d counselor be liable as
aforesaid, if h e shall give a sufficient b o n d , to be
approved by t h e clerk o f t h e district court, conditioned that he will p a y o r deliver t h e whole o r any
portion of such money o r property t o the claimant
in t h e event such claimant shall finally establish his
right thereto.
1953
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court. 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial

of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4thl041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
188

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The Parties.
William D. Blodgett and his wife Florence G. Blodgett

(the "Blodgetts") were owners of property in Salt Lake County
which they seek to protect from foreclosure by Alco Investment
("Alco"), whose partners are Stanley L. Pace ("Stanley Pace") and
Allan D. McComb ("McComb").
Although Stanley Pace and McComb purport to be partners
under the name Alco Investment (R.60 11 3, R. 71 11 3), the records
of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code do not list them as current registrants
of the name "Alco Investment".

The Division of Corporations and

Commercial Code reports that Allan D. McComb and Colleen C.
McComb filed an application to do business under an assumed name,
DBA Alco Investment, on September 22, 1976. Their DBA expired
September 22, 1984, as shown by a Certificate from the Director,
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.

(Ad. 4-5.)

Alcofs foreclosure efforts began in 1985 and were made
pursuant to an assignment of a judgment lien from Zions First
National Bank ("Zions") to Alco after Zions had received payment
of a default judgment on a promissory note made by Lorin N. Pace
("Lorin Pace"), father of Stanley Pace, and Betty Purcell (aka
"Betty Purcell Alexander" or "Betty Purcell Martsch" and sometimes spelled "Pursell").

Zions did not receive payment from co-

-4-

maker Betty Purcell.

Zions is not a party to this appeal and

stated in its answer to the complaint that:
18. Zions affirmatively alleges that it
claims no interest in the subject property.
(R. 68 11 18.)
2.

The Underlying Facts.
This case is the culmination of some fifteen years of

transactions and six court proceedings, including an appeal to
this Courtf in which various persons and entities have claimed an
interest in the Blodgetts1 land.
The Blodgetts1 problems began in 1971 when Raco Car
Wash Systems ("Raco"), whose president was Betty Purcell, falsely
represented to a bank that two tracts of Blodgett land could be
used as security for a loan to Raco.

The Blodgetts had agreed

with Raco that only one tract could be used as security but were
deceived into signing papers covering two.

They have been trying

to recover their property ever since.
The Blodgetts brought two earlier actions arising from the
unauthorized actions encumbering their land.

Zions brought three

court proceedings because Betty Purcell and her former attorney
Lorin Pace defaulted on their promissory note to Zions. After
Lorin Pace paid $27,262.59 under his default judgment on August
31, 1984, Zions purportedly assigned its judgments against Betty
Purcell to Alco.

Alco then attempted to foreclose on the

Blodgetts1 property because of Betty Purcell's prior but extinguished interest in the property. The Blodgetts thus brought this

-5-

action, seeking to resolve their property problems once and for
all.
The undisputed facts leading to this action are set
forth in numbered paragraphs.

The facts are documented in court

filesf judgments, title documents and deeds and other such
sources.

Because of the length and complexity of the facts, a

chronological list of the pertinent events, matters of public
record, is set forth in the Addendum.

(Ad. 6-9.)

This Court may

draw all legal conclusions justified by such facts. See e.g. ,
Betenson v. Call Auto and Equip. Sales, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah
1982) ("It is well established that where the issue is solely one
of law, . . . this Court is as capable of determining the question as the trial court. . . " ) .
1.

In 1969, the Blodgetts owned two adjacent tracts of

land located at approximately 6100 South Highland Drive in Salt
Lake County, Utah.

The Blodgetts operated a grocery store on the

larger tract (the "Store Tract").

They leased the smaller tract

(the "Car Wash Tract") to Raco for the installation of a car wash
in early 1969. The lease agreement with Raco provided that the
Blodgetts would pledge the Car Wash Tract as security for a loan
to Raco to finance the car wash installation.

Raco, acting

through its president Betty Purcell, made arrangements for the
loan with Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank").
["R."] 78, 79, 93.)

-6-

(Record

2.

Without the Blodgetts1 knowledge and prior to clos-

ing the loan, Valley Bank advised Raco that it required additional security in order to make the loan for the installation of the
car wash.

Raco falsely advised Valley Bank that the Blodgetts

had agreed that both their Store Tract and the Car Wash Tract
could be used as security for Raco's loan.
3.

(R. 79, 93.)

Valley Bank prepared a trust deed granting it a

security interest in both the Car Wash Tract and the Store Tract.
In addition, without first discussing the matter with either Raco
or the Blodgetts, Valley Bank prepared a promissory note in its
favor for signature by the Blodgetts as co-makers. (Id.)
4.

On November 5, 1971, the Blodgetts attended the

Raco loan closing at Valley Bank's offices. They intended to
execute documents necessary for the hypothecation of the Car Wash
Tract alone.

The only commitment the Blodgetts had made to any-

one concerning the use of any of their real property as security
until the moment of closing was the one contained in the Raco
lease? Valley Bank had a copy of the lease.
5.

(Id.)

Although Valley Bank usually explained the terms of

loan documents to borrowers unless they demonstrated some degree
of sophistication, it offered the Blodgetts no explanation of the
contents of the trust deed and, in particular, failed to call
attention to the trust deed's departure from a material provision
of the Raco lease:

that only the Car Wash Tract would be used as

security for Raco's loan.

(Id.)

-7-

6.

Valley Bank personnel spent half an hour explaining

the documents to Betty Purcell, although neither she nor her
corporation was making any contribution to the real property
collateral for the loan.

Valley Bank personnel made no similar

effort to explain the loan documents to the Blodgetts even though
the Blodgetts announced that they did not understand them.

(R.

80, 93-94.)
7.

When the Blodgetts asked about the promissory note.

Valley Bank falsely advised them that by executing the loan documents the Blodgetts assumed only a secondary or "stand-by" obligation.

The Blodgetts requested copies of all loan documents for

review; however. Valley Bank sent them a copy of the promissory
note only.

(R. 80, 94.)

8.

The Raco loan went into default; but Valley Bank

did not notify the Blodgetts or suggest to them that the Store
Tract was in jeopardy.
9.
1973.

(Id.)

Valley Bank foreclosed on the Store Tract in

To effectuate the foreclosure, Valley Bank utilized Wayne

Ashworth ("Ashworth") as trustee. (Id.)
10.

Ashworth failed to comply with the procedures

prescribed for non-judicial foreclosure of trust deeds in Utah.
Ashworth held a public trustee's sale which the Blodgetts
attended.

By reason of their misconception that only the Car

Wash Tract was subject to sale, the Blodgetts failed to take the
most elementary steps to protect their interests.

-8-

For example,

they did not require Ashworth to sell the property in separate
tracts or in a particular sequence.

Moreover, the Blodgetts did

not enter a bid even though the high bid was a small fraction of
the property's value.

The high bidder at the sale was Joe

Martsch, a director of Raco and Betty Purcell's husband at the
time.

(R. 80, 81, 94.)
11.

Neither Ashworth nor Valley Bank consulted with,

advised, or sought instruction from the Blodgetts before or
during the sale.

Both acted purely in Valley Bank's interest and

took the course of action most likely to assure that Valley Bank
would either be paid in full or acquire the tracts at a bargain
price. (Id.)
12.

On November 11, 1973, Joe Martsch conveyed a one-

half undivided interest in the Store Tract to Water Park
Corporation ("Water Park"), a corporation wholly owned by Betty
Purcell. (^IcL) Lorin Pace witnessed and notarized the
conveyance.
13.

(Ad. 10.)
The Blodgetts first became aware that the Store

Tract had been included in the sale when Joe Martsch asserted his
rights of ownership after the sale.

In 1974 the Blodgetts

brought suit to obtain the return of the Store Tract in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Civil No. 223407,
against Joe Martsch, Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch,
Doyle Nease, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Wayne A. Ashworth, trustee, Carl W. Tenny, Valley Bank & Trust

-9-

Company, and First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. ("Blodgett I").
The Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens on November 4, 1974
with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3714, at Page 334,
giving notice that they had filed Blodgett I to terminate the
interests of all of those defendants in and to the Store Tract.
(R. 81, 82, 98, 99.) Lorin Pace represented Raco and Betty
Purcell.

See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1978).
14.

ment.

The Blodgett I defendants moved for summary judg-

The trial court (per Baldwin, J.) granted the motion, and

the Blodgetts appealed.

This Court reversed and remanded

Blodgett I for trial on December 26, 1978. Blodgett v. Martsch,
supra, 590 P.2d at 304.
15.

On or about January 16, 1976, while Blodgett I was

still pending, Zions filed an action in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, against Betty Purcell, a
defendant in Blodgett I, and Lorin Pace, seeking judgment for
$27,262.59 on their unpaid promissory note.

Zions First National

Bank v. Betty Pursell [sic] Alexander and Lorin N. Pace, Civil
No. 232782, ("Zions I"). (R. 82.) A copy of the promissory note
from Lorin Pace and Betty Pursell to Zions is annexed.
(Ad. 12.) Zions alleged, inter alia:
2. On or about the 7th day of July,
1971, at Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendants
[Purcell and Lorin Pace], and each of them,
made, executed and delivered their promissory
note to the plaintiff [Zions], in the amount
of $27,262.59, payable on demand at Salt Lake
City, Utah. . . . (R. 9 11 2.)

-10-

16.

On March 3, 1976, Zions obtained a default judg-

ment in Zions I against Lorin Pace in the amount of $31,064.52.
(Ad. 31.)

Fifteen days later, on March 18, 1976, Lorin Pace

filed a Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel for Betty Purcell
(but not for Raco) in Blodgett I.
17.

(Ad. 13.)

On August 13, 1976, Zions obtained a default judg-

ment in Zions I against Betty Purcell in the amount of $31,064.52.
(R. 82.)
18.

Water Park, to which Joe Martsch had conveyed a

one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract in 1973, was
administratively dissolved September 30, 1977. An order of the
trial court in Zions I (per Durham, J.) concluded that Water
Park's assets had become the undivided property of Betty Purcell
upon the dissolution of Water Park on September 30, 1977. Thus,
according to that order, Betty Purcell was the owner of record of
a one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract (conveyed from
Joe Martsch to Water Park) as of September 30, 1977.

(R. 15; see

11 24 below.)
19.

In 1978, the Blodgetts brought a second action in

the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against
Betty Purcell and Water Park, seeking to terminate Betty
Purcell1s and Water Park's interest in the Store Tract. Blodgett
v. Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch and Water Park
Corporation, Civil No. C78-8017, ("Blodgett II"). (R. 15.)

-11-

20.

On March 13, 1979, Zions brought a second action

in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against
Betty Purcell for the purpose of enforcing the judgment obtained
against her in Zions I.
1685, ("Zions II") .
21.

Zions Bank v. Purcell, Civil No. C79-

(Ad. 14-15.)

On April 11, 1979, the trial court (per Durham,

J.) consolidated Blodgett I and Blodgett II for trial.

(Ad. 16-

17.)
22.

On May 1, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I and

Blodgett II (per Durham, J.) entered an order on default against
Water Park, conveying all right, title and interest of Water Park
in and to the Store Tract to the Blodgetts.

(R. 83, 100, 101,

Ad. 18-21.)
23.

On May 2, 1979, the trial court in Zions I (per

Durham, J.) set aside Zions1 August 13, 1976 default judgment in
the amount of $31,064.52 against Betty Purcell.
24.

(R. 83.)

On May 16, 1979, Zions obtained an order in Zions

II (per Durham, J.) determining that Water Park owned the Store
Tract, that Betty Purcell was the sole shareholder of Water Park,
that Water Park had been dissolved on September 30, 1977, and
that Betty Purcell became the owner of the subject real property
on September 30, 1977 by virtue of the dissolution.
stated further that:
"Any judgment lien [Zions] may have against
defendant [Purcell] which is properly docketed in the office of the Salt Lake County
Clerk constitutes a lien upon the above-12-

The order

described property [the Store Tract] as of
the date of such docketing if subsequent to
September 30, 1977. If any such judgment is
docketed prior to September 30, 1977, such
judgment shall constitute a lien commencing
September 30, 1977. (R. 84.)
Zions had no judgment against Betty Purcell on the date Judge
Durham entered this order.

The Blodgetts were not parties or

participants in Zions I or Zions II.
25.

(R. 83, 84.)

On or about May 29, 1979, Joe Martsch quitclaimed

all interest he had in the Car Wash Tract and in the Store Tract
to the Blodgetts, thus conveying to them his one-half undivided
interest in the Store Tract and his interest in the Car Wash
Tract.

(R. 84 f 102, see also Ad. 10.)
26.

On June 1, 1979, Zions obtained a second default

judgment against Betty Purcell in Zions I.
judgment was $27,262.59 —

The amount of the

$3,801.93 less than the amount of the

original default judgment Zions had obtained against her.

(R.

84.)
27.

On December 7, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I

and Blodgett II (per Baldwin, J.) held a pretrial hearing during
which the parties settled both cases.
ment were read into the record.
28.

The terms of the settle-

(R. 84, 85, 103-07.)

On December 7, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered an

order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II (the "Settlement Order")
approving the settlement reached at the pre-trial hearing.

A

certified copy of the December 7, 1979 Minute Order in Civil No.
223407 is annexed.

(Ad. 22.)
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29.

The terms of settlement approved in the Settlement

Order provided for:

(1) execution of quitclaim deeds by the

defendants in Blodgett I and Blodgett II conveying the Store
Tract to the Blodgetts; (2) payment of damages to the Blodgetts;
(3) dismissal with prejudice of the Blodgetts1 actions; (4) a
court order quieting title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts.
(R. 103-07.)
30.

On January 15, 1980, Betty Purcell executed a

quitclaim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts pursuant to the
terms approved in the Settlement Order.
31.

(R. 109-12.)

On May 5, 1980, the trial court (per Baldwin, J.)

entered an order (the "Dismissal Order") dismissing Betty Purcell
as a defendant in Blodgett I and Blodgett II. The Dismissal
Order did not include all of the terms of the settlement read
into the record at the pre-trial hearing before Judge Baldwin.
(R. 85.)
32.

In 1984 Zions commenced an action in the Third

Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, to renew its Zions I
judgments ("Zions III").
Pace, No. C84-0299.

Zions First National Bank v. Lorin N.

(See Ad. 11.)

After Zions III was filed,

Lorin Pace, father of Appellant Stanley Pace, paid Zions
$27,262.59, on August 31, 1984, for amounts due under the
judgment against him.

(R. 85, 86.)

Counsel for Zions confirmed

the payment by Lorin Pace in a letter dated August 18, 1986, a
copy of which is annexed. (Ad. 11.)

The letter substantiates and
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explains Zions1 averment in its answer in this case that it makes
no claim to the subject property.
33.

(R. 68.)

On or about August 31, 1984, Zions purportedly

assigned its judgment of May 16, 1979 in Zions I and its judgment
of June 2, 1979 in Zions II to Alco.

(See R. 85, 86.)

Alco's

DBA expired approximately three weeks later on September 22,
1984.

(Ad. 4-5.)
34.

On April 19, 1985, the Blodgetts received an in-

formal notice to enforce lien from Alco.

The notice stated that

Alco intended to execute on any judgment lien received by it from
Zions.

(R. 86.)
35.

On May 24, 1985, the Blodgetts brought the instant

action ("Blodgett III") against Zions, Stanley Pace, McComb and
Alco to quiet title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts.
Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens.
36.

The

(Id.)

On January 16, 1986 the trial court (per Sawaya,

J.) entered an order in Blodgett III granting the Blodgetts1
motion for summary judgment.

(R. 134-37.)

The judgment states:

Therefore, the court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees that:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D.
McComb dba Alco Investment, is denied.
2. The Motion of plaintiffs as against
all defendants, Zions First National Bank,
Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. McComb dba Alco
Investment, is granted as follows:
a. The judgment liens that arise on
behalf of the defendant, Zions First National
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Bank, within the civil actions known as Zions
Bank vs. Purcell and Pace, Civil S/>. 232782
[Zions I] and Zions Bank vs. Purcell, Civil
No. C79-1685, [Zions II], filed in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, which judgment liens and their
underlying judgments have been assigned to
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D.
McComb, dba Alco Investment, are void and of
no effect as against the real property that
is the subject of this action, [the Store
Tract] identified as [description omitted].
b. Title to the above-identified
real property is quieted in the plaintiffs
[the Blodgetts] as against any and all right,
title, or interest claimed by the defendants,
Zions First National Bank and Stanley L. Pace
and Allen D. McComb dba Alco Investment.
(R. 135-37.)
37.

On August 13, 1986, the trial court in Blodgett I

and Blodgett II (per Dee, J.) entered an order (the "Order and
Judgment of Quiet Title") granting the Blodgetts1 unopposed
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of
Quiet Title.

The Blodgetts filed the motion on March 17, 1986 to

correct a clerical error in the Dismissal Order to accord with
the settlement that had been read into the record and approved by
the trial court (per Baldwin, J.). Even though not required to
do so, the Blodgetts personally served Betty Purcell with a copy
of the motion.

(Ad. 23.)

The Order and Judgment of Quiet Title

provide:
The court being fully advised in the
premises and having considered the Motion of
plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and
decrees:
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1. The Order of Dismissal against
defendant Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell
Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 1980 by
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., is
hereby set aside.
2. Judgment is hereby entered against
Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch,
quieting Title of all right, title and interest of said defendant within the following
identified real property in and to the plaintiffs1 , William D. BLodgett and Florence G.
Blodgett. The real property to which this
quiet title judgment applies is located
within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
is more particularly identified as:
[description omittedl.
This Order shall relate back to and be
effective as of May 5, 1980.
The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash
Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is
hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and
all counter-claims of said defendants are
hereby dismissed with prejudice with the
parties to bear their own costs.
The sum of $2,400 on deposit with the court
in this case be paid over to plaintiffs by
the clerk of the court.
A copy of the Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is annexed.
23-25.)
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(Ad.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EVENTS

1969

Blodgetts lease Car Wash
Tract to Raco and agree to
pledge that tract only for
loan to finance installation
Lorin Pace and Purcell
make demand note to Zions
($27,262.59)

07/07/71

11/05/71

Blodgetts close loan with
Valley Bank, unknowingly
pledge Car Wash Tract and
Store Tract, sign note
Raco defaults on loan

1973

Valley Bank via Ashworth,
Trustee, forecloses both
tracts; Purcell's ex-husband
Martsch bids high for both
tracts

10/12/78

Trustee deed issued to Martsch
Martsch claims ownership to
Blodgetts

11/08/73

Martsch coveys 1/2 intrest in
Store Tract to Purcell's Water
Park; Lorin Pace notarizes quit
claim deed

11/04/74

Blodgetts sue Purcell, Martsch
and others, file lis pendens
(Blodgett I)
Summary judgment against
Blodgetts who appeal

01/16/76

Zions sues Purcell and
Lorin Pace for demand note
(Zions I)

Date

Blodgett Transactions
and Suits

Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco
Transactions and Suits

03/03/76

Zions takes default
against Lorin Pace
($31,064.52)

08/13/76

Zions takes default
against Purcell
($31,064.52)

09/30/77

Water Park is dissolved;
Purcell takes its assets,
becomes owner of Store Tract

1978

Utah Supreme Court orders
trial in Blodgett I
Blodgetts sue Water Park and
Purcell to terminate their
interests in Store Tract
(Blodgett II)

03/13/79

Zions sues Purcell to
enforce judgment in
Zions I (Zions II)

04/11/79

Blodgett I and Blodgett II
consolidated for trial

05/01/79

Default order conveys rights
of Water Park in Store Tract
to Blodgetts

05/02/79

Default in Zions I against
Purcell vacated

05/16/79

Zions obtains order that
Water Park was dissolved;
Purcell, as sole owner,
took its assets to become
sole owner of Store Tract
on Water Park's
dissolution Sept. 30,
1977; Zions may docket
lien against Store Tract
effective September 30,
1977

Date
05/29/79

Blodgett Transactions
and Suits

Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco
Transactions and Suits

Martsch quitclaims 1/2
interest in Store Tract
to Blodgetts

06/01/79

Zions takes second
default against Purcell
in Zions I ($27,262.59)

12/07/79

Blodgett I and JJ_ settled
a) quit claims
on record;
on Store Tract to Blodgetts;
b) damages to Blodgetts;
c) quiet title to Blodgetts;
d) suits dismissed with
prej udice

01/15/80

Purcell, Raco, Water Park
quitclaim interest in
Store Tract to Blodgetts

05/05/80

Dismissal order in Blodgett I
and 2 1 (corrected 8/13/86 to
match terms in record of
December 7, 1979) - title
quieted to Blodgetts

1984

Zions renews judgment
against Lorin Pace and
Purcell (Zions III)

08/31/84

Lorin Pace pays Zions
$27,262.59 (face amount
of note)

08/31/84

Zions assigns judgment to
Alco

09/22/84

Alco dba expires and not
renewed

04/19/85

Alco notifies Blodgetts of
intent to execute judgment
against Store Tract

05/24/85

Blodgetts sue Zions, S. Pace,
McComb and Alco (Blodgett III);
Blodgetts file lis pendens
Zions denies interest in
Store Tract

Date

Blodgett Transactions
and Suits

01/16/86

B l o d g e t t s obtain summary
judgment against Alco et
a l . ; appeal taken

08/13/86

Trial court corrects c l e r i c a l
error in j u d g m e n t , effective
May 5, 1980 to quiet title in
Blodgetts

Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco
T r a n s a c t i o n s and Suits

to***
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF QUIET TITLE

r I, ii 111 11 I .,

vs.
Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017 (Consolidated)

JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
Defendants.

Be ll remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion
of Dismissal

and

Enter Judgment

nl

before the Honorable David B. nee, «

Quiet

hearing

the above entitled court on

May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten n'i, ]o<l< ii in
.ntiff
record,

was present

.ester

by and

through

it's counsel

of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.

of

Defen-

de
either

In person or through counsel

previously
pleadings

served

with

personal

Plaintiffs'

defendant having been
Motion

and

the

associated

l

The

considered
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"
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the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders,

'

11 i'

ng

djudges and

decrees;
J

rl:ie 01:dei: • :: • f Dismissal agai

aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entere: May
H o i i c r a lb 1 e

B a 1d w i

2

hereby set aside,

udgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell

Betty Purcell M a r t s c h , gu-ieting Title ot
interesl

I • iillll d e l vt .1 a111

property in anc
G. Blodget ,t

'

aka

11 right, title and

i

*al

the plaintiffs 1 , William D. Blodgett and Florence
property to which this quiet title judgement

applies i s located within Salt Lake County, Stai
more particularly identified as:
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South),
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt f Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
0°20 50" East along center
line of Highland Drive 154.0
feet;l thence south 89°15 , 45 fl West 197.17 feet; thence South
0°17 45" West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street
(6100 South); thence North S g ^ S M S " East along said North
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning.
Excluding from said above-described property that ceilaiin
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-016Q-1, and more particularly described as follows: Beginning at the
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast
corner of said Section 16; and tangency to theo curve
of said
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 3 8 5 4 f 4 0 " East;
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367,0 foot radius
41
fcST
;ITY
1

he
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I

curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street.

May "Ji, I960',
I

Complaint of plaintiffs

ainst defendants Betty

Purcell Hartsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Wate
ation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and all countei
c 1 a i i ni mi ii' I

11: I I in mi ni I ' ni 11 mi

Il i ni i I i y d i s m i s s e d w i 11: :t p r e j u d i c e with

the parties to bear their own costs.
5.

The sum

$2,450 on deposit with the court in this

case be paid over t ::»" plaintiffs
Dated this

/ jb day of August, 1986.

3TVTE OP UTAH
) -,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) °"
I. T H i U N O ! * * O N I O , CLERK OF THE OUTPffCT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH DO HfiRKY
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